Safety verification of hybrid systems is in general undecidable. Due to practical applications, it is sufficient to only consider robustly safe hybrid systems in which a slight perturbation is guaranteed to result in the same desired safety property. In this paper, we provide a constraint based abstraction refinement for safety verification of nonlinear hybrid systems and prove that this refinement procedure will terminate for robustly safe nonlinear hybrid systems.
INTRODUCTION
Hybrid systems (Alur et al., 1995; Schaft and Schumacher, 2000; Ratschan and She, 2007 ) is a class of dynamical systems, which in addition to the discrete events also contain continuous behaviors that evolve according to differential equations or difference equations. Many examples of hybrid systems (Fehnker and Ivančić, 2004) are obtained when a digital system is embedded in an analog environment which, in many cases, is described by physical laws that are formulated using differential equations or difference equations. Such systems usually operate in safetycritical domains, for example, inside automobiles, aircrafts, and chemical plants. Thus, an important task is to verify that a given hybrid system is safe, that is, to verify that every trajectory of a given hybrid system starting from an initial state never reaches an unsafe state (i.e., a so-called "bad" state).
The safety verification problem of hybrid systems is in general undecidable and terminating algorithms exist only for certain special cases, for example, linear hybrid automata and o-minimal hybrid automata (Lafferriere et al., 1999) .
Since hybrid systems often model a given real system in practice with perturbations, the notation of robustness (Henzinger and Raskin, 2000; Fränzle, 2001; Girard and Pappas, 2006; Damm et al., 2007; Julius et al., 2007) has been introduced to model the given real system up to perturbations. Hence, from the practical viewpoint, it is sufficient to only consider robust systems in which a slight (quantifiable) perturbation is guaranteed to result in the same desired qualitative properties (e.g., safety and stability).
In this paper, we will provide a constraint based approach for safety verification of continuous-time hybrid systems Frehse, 2008) such that the termination of our approach is guaranteed even for a very rich class of models, which involve function symbols in {+, ×,ˆ, sin, cos, exp}. Note that unless otherwise specified, hybrid systems in this paper denote continuous-time hybrid systems.
Following our earlier works Ratschan and She, 2006; She and Zheng, 2008) , we continue to use constraints for describing hybrid systems. In addition, for describing robust hybrid systems, we use the solution sets to the corresponding constraints defined for hybrid systems with small perturbations.
For verifying safety property of hybrid systems, we use an abstraction refinement technology. That it, for a concrete hybrid system, we first split its state space into boxes and then abstract it to a finite transition system which over-approximates the concrete system in a conservative way. During the refinement procedure, we also include more information from the concrete system into the abstract one, which is done by constructing a reachability constraint, checking whether a certain state fulfills this constraint and removing states that do not fulfill this constraint by an interval based pruning algorithm. However, the interval based abstraction refinement in some cases results in the wrapping effect (Neumaier, 1993) , which will be explained in Subsection 3.1. For reducing such a wrapping effect, we propose a quantifier elimination based remedy. That is, we first construct a constraint to describe the reachable set on the boundaries of boxes such that every free variable only occurs once; then, we employ a special quantifier elimination method to get the exact solution set to this constructed constraint; finally, we use this exact solution set in the reachability constraint for further computation.
Moreover, based on our proposed remedy, we can prove that our abstraction refinement procedure will eventually terminate for robustly safe hybrid systems.
Compared to the discrete time model in (Damm et al., 2007) , there are variables for describing differentiation, which do not vary over the state space and may take unbound values. Moreover, compared to the counter-example guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) based approach (Klaedtke et al., 2007) , we avoid solving a large reachability constraint formulating states reachable via a trajectory over a finite number of abstract states (i.e., boxes).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate our basic notions on hybrid systems and robust hybrid systems. In Section 3, we introduce a constraint based abstraction refinement for safety verification of hybrid systems, associated with a remedy for reducing the wrapping effect in Subsection 3.1 and a special quantifier elimination method in Subsection 3.2. In Section 4 we analyze the termination of our abstraction refinement procedure with our proposed remedy for robustly safe hybrid systems. In Section 5 we conclude the paper.
ROBUST HYBRID SYSTEMS
We fix a variable m ranging over a finite set of discrete modes M = {m 1 , . . . , m n } and variables x 1 , . . . , x k ranging over closed real intervals I 1 , . . . , I k . We denote by S the resulting state space M × I 1 × · · · × I k and let X = {x 1 , . . . , x k }. For denoting the derivatives of x 1 , . . . , x k we use variablesẋ 1 , . . . ,ẋ k , ranging over R each, and letẊ = {ẋ 1 , . . . ,ẋ k }. Moreover, for denoting the targets of jumps, we use variables m
ranging over M and I 1 , . . . , I k and let
For simplicity, we sometimes use the vector x to denote x 1 , . . . , x k , and (m, x) to denote a state. Similar notations are used for x ′ and ẋ.
In order to describe hybrid systems we use constraints that are arbitrary Boolean combinations of equalities and inequalities over terms. These constraints are used, on the one hand, to describe the possible flows and jumps and, on the other hand, to mark certain parts of the state space (e.g., the set of initial/unsafety states). The semantics of a hybrid system is a transition system with an uncountable set of states.
Formally, the semantics of a hybrid system H = (Flow, Jump, Init, UnSafe) is a transition system
s satisfies Init}, S UnSafe = {s ∈ S : s satisfies UnSafe}, and Steps is defined as the union of two transition relations Steps C and Steps D , where Steps C ⊆ S × S corresponds to transitions due to continuous flows and is defined by:
and Steps D ⊆ S × S corresponds to transitions due to discrete jumps and is defined by:
It is well-known that checking whether a hybrid system is safe is an undecidable problem . However, in practice we are not interested with a hybrid system whose safety changes under small perturbations. Hence, it is sufficient to have an algorithm that can prove safety for systems whose safety does not change under small perturbations.
In order to introduce the notation of perturbations, we first define a distance measure on constraints as follows.
Definition 4. 
The distance between two atomic arithmetic constraints e r c and e
based on Definition 4, we can define the notion of an ε-perturbed solution set as follows.
Definition 5. A set P is an ε-perturbed solution set of a constraint φ if and only if 1. for every x ∈ P, there is a constraint φ * with
Example 1. Consider the constraint φ defined by x = 0. Clearly, {x : x = 0} is an ε-perturbed solution set due to the following:
and φ * (x * ) does not hold. Moreover, P = {x : x = ε} with ε > 0 is also an ε-perturbed solution set due to: 1. for x = ε, choosing x = ε/2 as φ * and x * = ε/2,
Example 2. Consider another constraint φ defined by x 2 < 0. Clearly, its solution set is empty and / 0 is an ε-perturbed solution set of φ. Moveover, P = {x : x 2 < ε} is also an ε-perturbed solution set of φ due to:
1. for every x ∈ P, choosing x 2 < ε as φ * and
2. for every x such that x ≥ √ ε, choosing x 2 < ε as φ * and x * = x + ε, d(φ, φ * ) = ε, d(x, x * ) = ε, and φ * (x * ) does not hold.
for every x such that x
≤ − √ ε, choosing x 2 < ε as φ * and x * = x − ε, d(φ, φ * ) = ε, d(x, x * ) = ε, and φ * (x * ) does not hold.
TERMINATION ANALYSIS OF SAFETY VERIFICATION FOR NON-LINEAR ROBUST HYBRID SYSTEMS
Definition 5 is extended for hybrid systems with small perturbations as follows. 
CONSTRAINT BASED ABSTRACTION REFINEMENT
In this section we describe a constraint based algorithm for safety verification of hybrid systems based on the abstraction refinement technology. That is, we abstract a hybrid system to a finite transition system (the abstraction) which is defined to be:
Definition 8. A transition system over a finite set Σ is a tuple (Trans, Init, Unsafe) where Trans ⊆ Σ × Σ and Init ⊆ Σ, Unsafe ⊆ Σ. We call the set Σ the state space of the system.
In contrast to Definition 2, here the state space is a parameter. This will allow us to add/remove states to the state space during abstraction refinement.
Definition 9.
A trajectory of a transition system (Trans, Init, UnSafe) over a set Σ is a function r : {0, . . . , p} → σ such that for all t ∈ {1, . . . , p}, (r(t − 1), r(t)) ∈ Trans. The system is safe if and only if there is no trajectory from an element of Init, to an element of Unsafe.
When we use abstraction to analyze hybrid systems, the abstraction should over-approximate the concrete system in a conservative way: if the abstraction is safe, then the original system should also be safe. If the current abstraction is not yet safe, we refine the abstraction, that is, we include more information about the concrete system into it. This results in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Abstraction Refinement. Input: a hybrid system H described by constraints Output: "safe", if the algorithm terminates let A be an abstraction of the hybrid system H while A is not safe do refine the abstraction A end while
In order to implement this algorithm, we need to fix the state space of the abstract system. Here we use pairs (m, B) , where m is one of the modes {m 1 , . . . , m n } and B is a hyper-rectangle (box), representing subsets of the concrete state space S. Together with an abstract state, we store the information whether it is initial or unsafe and the information from which other states it is reachable. We call such information the marks of the state. For the initial abstraction we use the state space
where all states are marked as initial, and unsafe, and all transitions between states are possible.
For refining the abstraction, we split a box into two pieces, replace one abstract state by two, and include more information from the concrete system into the abstract one by removing unreachable elements from the boxes, removing superfluous marks from the new abstract states, and removing unreachable states from the abstraction.
To remove unreachable elements from the boxes representing the abstraction, we use a constraint that formalizes when an element of the concrete state space might be reachable, and then remove elements that do not fulfill this constraint. In order to do this, for a box
Note that two boxes in the same mode are non-overlapping if their interiors are disjoint.
Observe that a point in a box B is reachable only if it is reachable either from the initial set via a flow in B, from a jump via a flow in B, or from a neighboring box via a flow in B. So we can formulate constraints corresponding to each of these conditions and then remove points from boxes that do not fulfill at least one of these constraints. For this, we first give a constraint describing flows within boxes as follows, which has been described in (Ratschan and She, 2006) . 
. , y k ) T ∈ B such that for every point u on the flow with its derivative˙ u, (m, u,˙ u) satisfies the flow constraint Flow(m, x,˙ x), then
where f low * B (t, x, y) denotes
We denote the above constraint by Reach B (m, x, y) .
Notice that in Lemma 1, the state (m, y) is assumed to be reachable from (m, x) via a flow in B. However, the information on the state (m, x) is missing, which in fact requires to be reachable via a trajectory starting from initial. Without loss of generality, we can beforehand assume that we already have a constraint Reachable B (m, x) describing that (m, x) is reachable from initial. Thus, the above three possibilities for reachability allow us to formulate the following theorem:
Theorem 1. For a set of abstract states B , a pair (m ′ , B ′ ) ∈ B and a point z ∈ B ′ , if (m ′ , z) is reachable and z is not an element of the box of any other abstract state in B , then
where
, and Bfl B,B ′ (m ′ , z) denote the following three constraints, respectively:
is the j-th lower face of B ′ , and in
F m ′ ,B ′ ( x) = ∃ẋ 1 , . . . , ∃ẋ k [Flow(m ′ , x, (ẋ 1 , . . . ,ẋ k )) ∧ x j ≤ 0] if F
is the j-th upper face of B ′ .
Based on Theorem 1, if we can prove that a certain point does not fulfill the big constraint in Theorem 1, we know that it is not reachable from the set of initial states. However, the big constraint is not first-order, since it uses some defined predicates (e.g., Reachable B and faces F of B ′ ). Thus, we need to eliminate the defined predicates by substituting the constraints implied by their definitions. For this, we first have to fix a certain constraint for Reachable B (m, x).
As an over-approximation, the first and simplest choice is to define the constraint Reachable B (m, x) as x ∈ B and denote the resulting constraint by Reachable 0 B ,B ′ (m ′ , z). We have studied this case with computational examples in (Ratschan and She, 2005; Ratschan and She, 2007; Ratschan and She, 2007a; Ratschan and She, 2006) by using a pruning algorithm (Ratschan, 2002) 
The above abstraction is easily computed since the set of abstract states is finite. Denoting the resulting transition system by Abstract H (B ), we have that:
Theorem 2. B ,B ′ (m ′ , z) with i ∈ {0, . . . }. Clearly, all these constraints also fulfill Theorem 1.
Since Reachable i B ,B ′ (m ′ , z) with i ≥ 1 is a very large constraint, we will avoid directly disproving such a constraint by computing an overapproximation of the reach set on the boundary of B, arriving at the following constraint that expresses a disjunction over all faces:
We denote it by reachbound B ,B (m ′ , x), and for each face F of B, we denote the corresponding disjunct by reachbound B ,B,F (m ′ , x). Since the disjuncts only depend on one box, we have to apply the pruning algorithm only for one abstract state, and we can store the resulting faces with that abstract state and use such information in the constraint Bfl B,B ′ (m ′ , z). Since these faces enclose the set of states where a flow might leave the abstract state, we call them the outflow-faces of the abstract state (cf., the use of faces in the analysis of rectangular automata (Preußig et al., 1998) and the use of faces for CEGAR based reachable analysis in Algorithm 4 in (Klaedtke et al., 2007) ). Note that this recursive reasoning based method with computational examples has also been described in (Ratschan and She, 2008) and implemented in (Ratschan and She, 2007a) .
A Remedy for Reducing the Wrapping Effect
We have introduced a recursive reasoning based method for safety verification of hybrid systems above. However, box splitting in some cases will still lead to an worse over-approximation (Preußig et al., 1998) . This phenomenon is called as the wrapping effect (Neumaier, 1993) , which is illustrated by the following example. 
into the following four boxes:
Using our recursive version again, we get the following three boxes:
Associated with these three boxes, we have the following faces:
So, we will in this subsection provide a remedy for reducing the wrapping effect. Specifically, we improve the recursive reasoning by four complements which are described in details as follows:
1. For each abstract (m, B) ∈ B , we first compute the intervals for the corresponding components of the derivatives of the states in (m, B) . That is, we apply our pruning algorithm to the following constraint and R k :
to obtain a box containing all the solutions oṅ a 1 , . . . ,ȧ k satisfying the above constraint. We denote this resulting box byḂ. This information has in fact been computed when we apply our pruning algorithm to the big constraint in Theorem 1 and (m, B). So, we just need to store this computed information and do not need to apply our pruning algorithm once more. , x) , which describes the reachable information on the face F. Moreover, note that for abstract states marked as initial or reachable with jumps, we do not need to recompute the exact solution set on the faces but directly use the over-approximations instead, which can be easily understood after termination analysis in Section 4.
For each
4. We use the reachable information on the faces in the constraint Bfl B,B ′ (m ′ , z) for further computation until a fixpoint is reached. Now, for Example 4, starting with the initial abstraction, after applying the above improvement, the over-approximative reachable set on the face is computed to be 
Quantifier Elimination
In this subsection, we will discuss how to apply the quantifier elimination mentioned in Subsection 3.1.
We first assume thatḂ =Ḃ 1 × · · · ×Ḃ k is the box obtained by applying the pruning algorithm to Constraint (2) and R k . Let I be the set {i : 0 ∈Ḃ i }. Without loss of generality, let I = {i 1 , . . . , i m } and consider the following constraint: If the solution set for x is defined by a polyhedron which is formulated by a combination of linear (in)equalities over x, the solutions set for y will also be formulated by a combination of linear (in)equalities over y, implying that the solution set for y is also defined by a polyhedron.
TERMINATION ANALYSIS FOR SAFETY VERIFICATION
In this section, we will analyze the termination of our abstraction refinement based procedure for robustly safe hybrid systems, associated with the remedy described in Subsection 3.1. Note that we here simply assume that the continuous behaviors evolve according to differential equations, that is, we only consider deterministic continuous evolutions. For the non-deterministic cases, we can similarly handle it. Without loss of generality, we assume that in the flow constraint, the right side of the implication is of form˙ (φ m,B , R k ) be the result of applying our interval based pruning algorithm to φ (m,B) and R k . Due to the convergence of the interval based pruning algorithm (Ratschan, 2002; Damm et al., 2007) , we have:
